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Leverage Deviations and Acquisition Probability in the UK: The moderating effect of 
firms’ internal capabilities and deal diversification potential  
 
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, we provide evidence to suggest that a firm’s deviation 
from its optimal financial leverage may impede its ability to undertake future expansions. We also find 
the negative effect of leverage deviation on acquisition probability to be moderated by firms’ existing 
capabilities. Further, we find those deviating firms to have better prospects of achieving growth when 
they pursue cross-industry and/or cross-country mergers and acquisitions. Overall, our findings imply 
that deviations from the optimal financial leverage may be costly to firms but this cost is not symmetric 
across all firms and all deal types.   
Keywords: optimal leverage; industrial diversification; geographic diversification; internal capabilities; 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
Introduction 
The link between corporate financial and diversification strategies has long been an important research 
issue in the finance and management literature (see Barton & Gordon, 1988; Doukas & Kan, 2008; 
Krapl, 2015; Agyei-Boapeah, 2015). For instance, Barton & Gordon (1988) propose that since a firm’s 
diversification strategy may reflect the risk appetite of top managers, diversification should be related to 
financial leverage. This paper contributes to this literature on the leverage-diversification link by 
investigating how committing to undertake diversifying acquisitions (relative to non-diversifying ones) 
may influence the financing constraints that may be faced by firms that deviate from their optimal 
(target) leverage ratios.1  
Drawing on the trade-off theory of capital structure (see, Myers, 1977; Uysal, 2011) and the 
managerial inefficiency theory of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (see Manne, 1965; Jovanovic & 
Rousseau, 2002), we argue in this article that extreme deviations from the optimal leverage ratio (i.e. 
                                                          
1Although “target leverage” and “optimal leverage” are used synonymously in the finance literature, in this article 
about M&As, we restrict ourselves to the term “optimal leverage” in order to avoid any potential confusion of 
erroneously interpreting the target leverage to mean the leverage of the acquired firm. This confusion may arise 
because the “acquired firms” are often referred to as the “target firms” in the M&A literature.  
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leverage deviations) may represent an inefficient management action which can hamper the initiation and 
successful completion of M&As. Despite theoretical predictions, the direct link between leverage 
deviation and the ability to undertake M&As remained largely unexplored until recently when Uysal 
(2011) utilised data on US domestic acquisitions to show that firms with leverage deviations are unable 
to aggressively bid for acquisition targets, which ultimately impedes their ability to complete domestic 
acquisitions.  
The present article relates to, but also differs in a number of ways from the prior study by Uysal 
(2011). First, while the prior study was restricted to only domestic acquisitions made by US firms, this 
article examines the link between leverage deviation and acquisition probability within a framework that 
incorporates both domestic and cross-border acquisitions. Given the surge in the volume of cross-border 
acquisitions from 23% in 1998 to about 45% in 2007 (Eriel et al., 2012), and the fact that cross-border 
acquisitions tend to be larger and rely more on external financing (Agyei-Boapeah, 2015), the exclusion 
of cross-border acquisitions from the prior study presents a partial view of the association between 
leverage deviation and acquisition probability. This paper is, therefore, the first to present a relatively 
more complete view of the link between leverage deviation and acquisition probability by examining 
both domestic and cross-border acquisitions.   
Second, to date, most of the existing empirical research on leverage deviation has been conducted 
in the US context. The extent to which the explanations offered in the US context hold in other 
countries remains largely unknown. A notable exception is the recent study by Ahmed & Elshandidy 
(2018) which explores why overleveraged British firms prefer foreign over domestic acquisitions. While 
they make an important contribution to the leverage deviation literature from a UK context, their focus 
and approach did not permit them to be directly address the primary issue of acquisition probability (i.e. 
the ability to successfully undertake acquisitions), as well as tackle how other forms of leverage 
deviations (i.e. underleveraging, moderate- and extreme-leverage deviations) might differently impact 
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acquisition probability. Our paper directly addresses these issues within the UK context, thereby, 
offering results that can easily be compared with prior US findings.  
Like the US, the UK is very active in the market for corporate control, which offers us sufficient 
M&A observations for a robust analysis. The UK, for example, was the largest acquiring country 
globally in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2000). Therefore, the contribution we make to the literature by focusing 
on UK firms is significant because due to the institutional heterogeneity across countries, capital 
structure decisions tend to vary across countries (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Antoniou et al., 2008). While 
the UK has a vibrant market-based financial system which is similar to the US (see Antoniou et al., 
2008), the UK’s capital market is relatively smaller and less liquid than the US, suggesting that financial 
constraint may be a more serious problem for UK firms compared to their US counterparts.2  
Third, despite the possibility for investors to react differently to various types of investment 
projects, the prior studies on the link between leverage deviation and financing/investments have often 
failed to distinguish between the impact of firms’ leverage deviations on diversifying and non-
diversifying investments (e.g. Hovakimian et al., 2001; Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Harford et al., 2009; 
Uysal, 2011). Ahmed & Elshandidy (2018) show that overleveraged firms are more likely to diversify 
globally to create value for their shareholders, implying that investors may be more willing to fund M&A 
deals that expand the firms’ global diversification. Our paper adds to this literature by suggesting that 
since some investors find merit in synergistic diversification moves (see Lewellen, 1971; Doukas & Kan, 
2008), while others frown upon diversifying expansions (e.g. Lang & Stulz, 1994), firms with leverage 
deviation that undertake M&As may face relatively lower or higher costs depending on the 
diversification characteristic of the proposed M&A deal. It is noteworthy that our contribution in this 
respect is not limited to global diversification, but extends to industrial diversification as well. 
                                                          
2The 2012 data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank suggests that the financial market in 
the US is about 9 times bigger than that of the UK, when the size of the financial market is measured by market 
capitalisation (i.e. $21.4 trillion vs. $2.5 trillion). The data also suggest that the US has a more liquid financial 
market compared to the UK (i.e. stock turnover ratios of 125% vs. 84%). 
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Finally, we draw on the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (see Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 
1997) to investigate how the effect of leverage deviation on acquisition probability may be conditional 
on the firm’s internal capabilities such as management skills/ability, organisational culture/processes as 
well as technological know-how and innovation. These firm-idiosyncratic capabilities are not only a 
source of competitive advantage but could also be crucial in making M&As a real value-enhancing 
strategy. Thus, we posit that firms with superior existing (non-financial) resources/capabilities may be 
able to reduce the leverage deviation costs and consequently mitigate any potential impact on acquisition 
ability. This final contribution that we seek to make to the literature is novel since, to the best of our 
knowledge and extensive literature search, the prior related studies, thus far, have not addressed it.   
Our empirical analysis provides evidence to suggest that inefficient (sub-optimal) managers who 
disregard their firms’ optimal leverage ratios tend to have a significantly lower ability to undertake 
M&As. We further find that the cost of deviating from the optimal leverage is asymmetrically higher for: 
(1) overleveraged firms relative to underleveraged firms, and (2) extreme deviant firms relative to 
moderate deviant firms. In addition, we find the negative effect of leverage deviation on acquisition 
probability to be moderated by firms’ existing levels of (non-financial) resources/capabilities. Finally, 
we find that firms with leverage deviation have a better chance of completing diversifying acquisitions 
(i.e. cross-industry and cross-border acquisitions) relative to non-diversifying acquisitions (i.e. within-
industry and domestic acquisitions). These findings have important implications for both theory and 
practice in corporate policy. Firstly, the results provide support for the relevance of the optimal 
leverage ratio and the trade-off theory of capital structure, as well as, the inefficient management theory 
of M&As by suggesting that deviations from the optimal leverage may hinder firms’ ability to undertake 
investment projects. Further, the findings imply that firms that deviate from their optimal leverage have 
better prospects of successfully completing acquisitions when they have superior firm-specific 
capabilities and/or when they select acquisition deals that have the potential to diversify their cash flows 




Related literature and hypotheses development 
M&As as a means for firm growth 
This study first explores how a firm’s deviation from its optimal leverage influences its ability (and/or 
incentive) to invest and grow by M&As. Although firms can grow by some other means such as internal 
development and cooperation (e.g. joint ventures), this article focuses on M&As whose speed (over 
internal development) and full control over resources (relative to cooperation) often make them 
advantageous strategic tools for managers to achieve firms’ expansion (Eschen & Bresser, 2005).  
Arguably, these unique features of M&As (speed and full control) make them an attractive growth 
strategy for managers, and perhaps explain why M&As remain a popular corporate expansion strategy 
and continue to receive research attention. We contribute to this immense literature on M&As, in 
particular, the research on the drivers of M&A decisions. Existing research on the managerial motives 
(incentives) for undertaking M&As broadly classifies the drivers of M&A decisions into two, i.e., 
synergy-based theories and non-synergy motives. The latter involves agency-motivated (Jensen, 1986; 
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1990) or hubris-driven (Roll, 1986) deals that often result in value-
destroying M&As.  
By contrast, the synergy-based literature (e.g. Stigler, 1964; Manne, 1965; Jovanovic & Rousseau, 
2002; Eschen & Bresser, 2005) proposes that M&As are planned and executed by managers to create, 
increase or maximize shareholders’ wealth, and thus value-maximizing (efficient) managers are more 
likely to undertake acquisitions. The potential sources of synergistic gains from M&As vary and may 
include: (1) increasing market power (Stigler, 1964); (2) augmenting the firm’s strategic resource 
position (Eschen & Bresser, 2005); (3) eliminating managerial inefficiency (Manne, 1965; Jovanovic & 
Rousseau, 2002); and (4) achieving financing advantages by exploiting unused debt capacity of the other 
merging firm (Ghosh & Jain, 2000), or improving the merged firm’s debt capacity (Lewellen, 1971). 
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Altogether, to the extent that investors support value-enhancing M&As, then the synergy-based 
theories (particularly the managerial inefficiency theory) posit that better and efficient managers (for 
acquiring firms) are more likely to obtain the necessary financing to undertake M&As. Within this 
theoretical context, the current study examines whether the sub-optimal management of the firm’s 
capital structure (via deviations from the optimal leverage) adversely influences the firm’s 
ability/incentive to undertake M&As.  
 
Leverage deviation, access to financing, and M&As 
The first question that we ask and seek to answer is whether there a relationship between a firm’s 
deviation from its optimal leverage ratio and its ability to undertake M&As. Addressing this question is 
important and deserves attention because while several motives for M&As exist, arguably, M&As can 
only occur if the acquiring firm is able to raise funds to finance the deal. Despite the crucial role of 
financing in the firm’s decision to undertake acquisitions, the financing of M&As remains understudied, 
and the scant literature on the matter is largely about the abnormal announcement returns associated 
with the method of payment (see e.g. Martynova & Renneboog, 2009). We extends this literature by 
exploring how a firm’s past financing policies may create future financing constraint for it, and 
subsequently influence its ability to undertake acquisitions. Although availability of financial resources is 
important in almost all types of corporate expansions, it perhaps becomes more crucial for growth by 
M&As due to the relatively shorter window within which acquisitions are to be negotiated and 
completed once a potential target becomes available.   
Our central argument in this paper is that extreme deviations from the optimal leverage ratio may 
be associated with lower acquisition likelihood because extreme leverage deviations may be viewed by 
capital providers as sub-optimal (i.e. an inefficient management action) which then creates financing 
constraints for firms with such sub-optimal managers. Underpinning this argument is the trade-off 
theory of capital structure which predicts that firms should maintain optimal leverage ratios because the 
7 
 
optimal leverage ratio maximizes the value of the firm (see, e.g. Myers, 1977; Uysal, 2011). An 
important implication is that firms that deviate from their optimal leverage ratios could face some 
substantial costs since they may be viewed by investors as being “non-maximizers” of firm value. One 
such costs of leverage deviation (i.e. deviations from the optimal leverage) is financing and investment 
constraints (see, Hovakimian et al., 2001; Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Harford et al., 2009; Uysal, 2011). 
Leverage deviations may be positive (i.e. firms may overleverage) or negative (i.e. firms may 
underleverage), but much of the existing empirical literature suggests that the cost of overleveraging is 
higher than that of underleveraging (van Binsbergen et al., 2010; Uysal, 2011). Perhaps, this is because 
the bankruptcy costs associated with overleveraging may be regarded by investors to be a more serious 
problem than the cost of forgoing the tax savings associated with underleveraging. Consequently, a bulk 
of the existing empirical evidence supports the conjecture that it is overleveraging (but not 
underleveraging) that is associated with financing and investment constraints (see Hovakimian et al., 
2001; Harford et al., 2009; Uysal, 2011). For example, Harford et al. (2009) show that overleveraged 
firms are less (more) likely to finance acquisitions with debt (equity). Given that the cost of equity 
capital is generally higher than the cost of debt capital (see Lee et al., 1996), these findings imply that 
overleveraged firms are likely to finance their investments at a relatively higher cost of capital, and may 
thus face external financing difficulties, which could, in turn, constrain their investments.  
Besides the external (debt) financing constraints, it has also been suggested that high-leveraged 
firms may also face internal financing constraints (see Jensen, 1986), since debt capital commits 
managers to regularly pay out cash flow as interest payments, thereby, restricting the availability of 
corporate funds at the disposal of managers. The existing empirical evidence largely shows a negative 
(positive) association between high leverage (low leverage) and M&A activities (Ghosh & Jain, 2000), 




A common feature of the empirical studies so far has been the fact that they distinguish between the 
direction of deviation (i.e. overleveraging or underleveraging) without any attempt at considering the 
extent of deviation (i.e. extreme deviation or moderate deviation) from the optimal leverage ratio. 
Focusing on the extent of deviation from the optimal leverage is important because the cost of leverage 
deviation is likely to vary with the absolute distance between a firm’s actual and optimal leverage ratios 
(Fischer et al., 1989). In fact, it is possible for some overleveraged firms to be very close to the optimal 
capital structure, in which case they are unlikely to face severe financial/investment constraints. Thus, 
the documented link between overleveraging and financing/investment constraints may only be 
restricted to those overleveraged firms that aggressively/extremely go beyond their optimal leverage 
ratios.  
Similarly, it may be the case that underleveraged firms that substantially stay below their optimal 
leverage ratios may be representative of those firms that are unable to attract external debt capital. 
While moderate and occasional underleveraging may be a strategic choice by managers to store up debt 
capacity for future investments (Ghosh & Jain, 2000; DeAngelo et al., 2011), extreme and persistent 
underleveraging could indicate poor management (i.e. inefficient capital structure policy), or represent 
firms with inferior growth opportunities, all of which can lead to financing/investment constraints. 
Empirically, Elsas & Florysiak (2011) show that both extreme under- and over-leveraged firms face 
asymmetrically higher deviation costs (i.e. cost of staying suboptimal) than moderately under- and over-
leveraged firms.3 In sum, deviation costs are greater when firms are further away from (either above or 
below) the optimal leverage ratio and, therefore, both extreme under- and over-leveraging may be 
costly to firms.     
On the basis of the foregoing discussions, unlike most prior studies on leverage deviation, the 
current article considers the relationship between the extent of leverage deviation (i.e. moderate 
deviation and extreme deviation) on the one hand and financing/investment constraints on the other 
                                                          
3Elsas & Florysiak (2011) report that the speeds of adjustment towards leverage targets, which denote the 
deviation costs, are 36%, 38%, 45%, and 50% for moderately underleveraged firms, moderately overleveraged 
firms, extremely underleveraged firms, and extremely overleveraged firms, respectively.  
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hand. We contend that because the firm’s value is maximized at the optimal level of leverage, any 
substantial and systematic departure from the optimal leverage ratio (whether above or below) is likely 
to be associated with financing constraints, which, in turn, could restrict the firms’ ability to undertake 
M&As.  
Finally, it is plausible that extremely underleveraged firms have no present borrowing needs 
because they, perhaps, face limited investment opportunity sets. This is because firms generally resort to 
the external capital market for funds only when the value of their planned investments exceeds their 
available internal funds. So, extremely underleveraged firms may represent those firms that have no 
immediate borrowing needs. Similarly, extremely overleveraged firms may have exhausted their growth 
opportunities by borrowing to invest in the past. Taking such a perspective makes extremely under- and 
over-leveraged firms inferior firms (i.e. low q firms), thus, unlikely to become acquirers according to 
the managerial inefficiency theory of M&As. In the end, consideration of the view on limited investment 
opportunities still lead us to predict a negative relationship between leverage deviation and acquisition 
probability. However, in order to reduce any possibility of the limited opportunity set explanation 
masking our financing constraint arguments, we are careful to specifically control for the firms’ growth 
opportunities in our empirical analyses.  
Overall, if extreme deviations from optimal leverage represent sub-optimal management action (as 
predicted by the trade-off theory of capital structure) and sub-optimal managers are less likely to 
become acquirers in M&A transactions (as predicted by the management inefficiency theory of M&As), 
then we hypothesise as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between leverage deviation (particularly 
extreme deviations) and the probability of undertaking acquisitions. 
 
The internal capabilities hypothesis  
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We draw from the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm to suggest that the average cost of 
leverage deviation may be lower for firms that possess superior internal capabilities, and therefore, have 
the potential to convert M&A opportunities into value-creating strategies for shareholders. We argue 
that such firms, even when they deviate from the optimal leverage, may be treated preferentially by 
investors – i.e., investors may deny funds to deviant firms with inferior internal capabilities, but not to 
their counterparts with better capabilities.  
The RBV emphasizes the importance of idiosyncratic firm attributes (capabilities and resources) in 
shaping firms’ competitive advantage and their ability to implement value-creating strategies (Barney, 
1991; Teece et al., 1997). The theory suggests that firms tend to derive competitive advantage through 
their ownership and control of resources/capabilities that are often rare, intangible, and highly valued by 
investors (Barney, 1991). These resources/capabilities include managerial skills/abilities, organisational 
culture/dynamism, technological know-how and innovation capabilities (see Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 
1997). Clearly, the availability of these valuable (intangible) organisational resources/capabilities equips 
the firm to effectively deal with its challenges including financial constraints and devise appropriate 
actions to neutralise them.  
Given that such valuable resources are heterogeneously distributed across firms, the RBV suggests 
that differences in resource/capabilities endowment may influence firms’ growth prospects, ability to 
extract more synergistic gains from M&As, and hence, attractiveness to investors. Following the RBV, 
we posit that the negative effect of leverage deviation (i.e. financing constraints) on firm growth will 
decrease with internal capabilities derived from a portfolio of organisational resources. Thus, we submit 
that firms with higher internal capabilities are unlikely to have their ability to complete acquisitions 
impeded when they deviate from the optimal leverage. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 is formulated for 
testing.  
Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of leverage deviation on the probability of undertaking 




The industrial diversification hypothesis  
Diversification theory provides numerous explanations as to why firms diversify; including agency 
reasons, development of internal capital markets, obtaining co-insurance benefits and increased market 
power [see Erdorf et al. (2013) for a review of diversification theories]. Taking a strategic management 
perspective and emphasizing the agency, market power, and resource-based theories, some empirical 
studies show that diversifying (cross-industry) expansions may be less value-enhancing compared to 
related (within-industry) expansions (e.g. Montgomery & Singh, 1984; Morck et al., 1990). For 
instance, Montgomery & Singh (1984) argue that the potential for synergistic gains is greater in within-
industry expansions due to the better strategic fit in manufacturing processes, marketing requirements, 
research and managerial tasks across the various related segments of the organisation. From this 
perspective, proposing to undertake cross-industry (diversifying) acquisitions, relative to within-
industry acquisitions may be viewed less favourably by investors. Similarly, the research examining the 
value impact of industrial diversification by comparing the value of diversified firms to their focused 
counterparts almost unanimously document the existence of a diversification discount, suggesting that 
(on average) firms destroy value by engaging in diversifying expansions (e.g. Lang & Stulz, 1994).   
However, recent studies point out that the value of diversification to firms differs over time, 
particularly depending on the prevailing economic environment. Erdorf et al. (2013) note that since 
financial constraints are more binding during recessions, the value of diversification is higher during 
recessionary periods when there is limited credit on external capital markets. Consistent with these 
conjectures, prior research (e.g. Yan et al., 2010; Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016) provides evidence 
of substantial value for diversified firms during periods of depressed external capital markets. 
Kuppuswamy & Villalonga (2016) report that the value of diversified firms relative to focused firms 
increased by 4-5% during the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis. They further provide evidence that 
attributes these diversification gains to significant increases in conglomerates’ leverage (i.e. borrowing 
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ability) relative to comparable portfolios of focused firms, and to improved efficiency of internal capital 
markets. Finally, they show that these gains are restricted to cross-industry diversifiers, and do not 
extend to within-industry diversifiers.  
Lewellen’s (1971) co-insurance theory explains why pursuing a cross-industry (unrelated) 
diversification strategy may be associated with financing advantages. He submits that M&As, especially 
diversifying (conglomerate) mergers, create a combined entity that has less volatile cash flows compared 
to the pre-merger firms acting separately. This reduced volatility, he notes, is due to the co-insurance 
effect that may exist when the cash flows of acquirers and target firms are less than perfectly positively 
correlated. Since cash flows are less (more) positively correlated among firms in different (the same) 
industries, the co-insurance benefit should be greater (lesser) for firms that diversify into different 
(same) industries. Thus, the enhanced stability in cash flow due to the coinsurance effect should translate 
into financing advantages (i.e. improved borrowing capacity) for cross-industry diversifiers. Empirically, 
Singhal & Zhu (2013) find that diversification reduces the probability of a firm filing for bankruptcy 
while Hann et al. (2013) show that industrial diversification reduces firms’ cost of capital by reducing 
their systematic risk. These findings imply that lenders tend to be more confident in supplying funds to 
diversified firms than to focused firms. 
While the financing advantages enjoyed by diversified firms over their focused counterparts are 
obvious, those of pursuing cross-industry (diversifying) M&As as opposed to within-industry (related) 
M&As may seem less obvious. Thus, we specifically point out how undertaking cross-industry M&As 
(but not within-industry M&As) may be financially beneficial to constrained firms. Firms borrow today 
and expect to pay back out of their future cash flows which depend on the type of investments they 
undertake. So lenders may supply capital to financially constrained firms today (to possibly fund their 
M&As) giving consideration to how the proposed investments (e.g. cross-industry vs. within-industry) 
impact their future cash flows. To the extent that making cross-industry M&As increases the firm’s 
business segment unrelatedness, this type of investment should improve future cash flow stability 
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(Lewellen, 1971), reduce default risk (Singhal & Zhu, 2013), and enhance borrowing capacity 
(Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016). The overall effect, consequently, is a relaxed financing/investment 
constraint for firms making cross-industry acquisitions, but not for those undertaking within-industry 
acquisitions. 
Similar conclusions can be reached from the inefficient (poor) management perspective. If firms 
with extreme leverage deviations are considered to be poor performers in their existing industries, then 
they may have a greater incentive to seek diversifying (cross-industry) expansions, since Morck, Shleifer 
& Vishny (1990) and Lang & Stulz (1994) suggest that poor performers have an incentive to enter new 
lines of businesses. Therefore, diversifying expansions seem to present new growth opportunities to 
poor performers (e.g. firms with limited investment opportunities in their core industries), leading to 
value creation for them. Although not all diversifying acquisitions by poor performers may be value-
enhancing, there is growing evidence to suggest that under external financing constraint conditions, 
even poor managers in diversified firms become more efficient in their investment decisions (see Yan et 
al., 2010; Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016). Thus, we expect financially constrained firms to be more 
efficient in their diversification decisions by selecting value-enhancing diversifying (cross-industry) deals.  
Finally, investors tend to anticipate the financing and other benefits of diversification and react 
accordingly at the announcement of M&A deals (see Ghosh & Jain, 2000). Consequently, acquiring 
firms may not need to wait until the consummation of acquisitions in order to realise the diversification 
benefits in the form of lower bankruptcy risk and cheaper capital. It is probable that those benefits could 
be realised in the pre-merger years when the firms propose and commit to undertaking diversifying 
acquisitions. We, therefore, expect investors to anticipate these industrial diversification benefits when 
firms propose to undertake cross-industry acquisitions, leading to a lesser, if not complete elimination of 




Hypothesis 3: The negative effect of leverage deviation on the probability of undertaking 
acquisitions is mitigated when firms undertake cross-industry (diversifying) acquisitions, 
rather than when they make within-industry (related) acquisitions.    
 
The geographic diversification hypothesis  
The finance/international business literature suggests that acquiring domestic firms should have different 
risk/return implications compared to undertaking cross-border acquisitions (see Ahmed & Elshandidy, 
2018; Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; Reeb, Mansi, & Allee, 2001). Drawing from the co-insurance effect, these 
studies generally suggest that a benefit of geographic diversification is lower earnings volatility as firms 
are able to receive cash flows from imperfectly correlated foreign markets, which, in turn, leads to a 
lower cost of borrowing for geographically diversified firms. Empirically, Reeb et al. (2001) report that 
geographic diversification is positively (negatively) related to credit rating (yield spread). Similarly, 
Mansi & Reeb (2002) find that an average geographically diversified firm in their sample enjoys about a 
52 basis point reduction in its cost of debt financing, which translates into greater borrowing capacity. In 
aggregate, these studies suggest that geographic diversification confers financing benefits on firms by 
reducing (improving) the bankruptcy risks (borrowing abilities) of geographically diversified 
corporations in comparison to purely domestic corporations. 
The literature on foreign direct investment suggests further advantages of geographic 
diversification. Cross-border acquisitions, which often result in increased levels of geographic 
diversification, enable firms to expand into new geographic locations and to obtain strategic assets, 
advanced technologies, and new skills that cannot be obtained by purely domestic firms (see Nocke & 
Yeaple, 2007). Thus, a geographically diversified firm may enjoy some competitive advantages over 
their domestic counterparts, which may consequently result in better performance by geographically 
diversified firms. Indeed, empirical research on the impact of cross-border acquisitions on the acquiring 
firms’ shareholders’ wealth suggests that cross-border acquisitions (relative to domestic acquisitions) 
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enhance shareholders’ wealth (see Goergen & Renneboog, 2004). This implies that investors do 
recognise the potential benefits of geographic diversification associated with cross-border acquisitions 
and react positively upon their announcements.  
However, just like industrial diversification, geographic diversification is not a guaranteed route to 
success. Several studies show that diversifying geographically can expose the firm to additional sources of 
risks such as foreign exchange risks and political risks (see Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; Krapl, 2015). Krapl 
(2015) finds higher systematic risks, idiosyncratic risks, and total risks for geographically diversified US 
firms. Within the M&A context, Agyei-Boapeah (2015) shows that the increased risk associated with 
geographic diversification translates into lower borrowing for British firms that diversify geographically, 
especially when the firms diversify into less developed (riskier) countries. Beyond increased risks, other 
studies point out increased costs/complexities in international business due to 
geographic/cultural/psychic distance between the home nations of geographically diversified firms and 
their host countries (e.g., Kogut and Singh, 1988).  
Taken together, geographic diversification seems to present some benefits and/or risks/costs to 
firms which may result in lower (or greater) financing constraint for a geographically diversified firm 
relative to a purely domestic firm. Unlike domestic acquisitions, when firms pursue cross-border 
acquisitions, they are often able to increase their levels of geographic diversification, especially when 
they buy targets from countries in which they previously had no operations. Therefore, if investors 
incorporate the risk/return implications of the proposed acquisition into their capital supply decisions, 
then the financing/investment constraints associated with leverage deviation may be more or less severe 
for those firms with leverage deviation that propose to pursue cross-border acquisitions compared to 
those firms pursuing domestic acquisitions. In fact, Ahmed & Elshandidy (2018) recently show that 
overleveraged firms are more inclined to undertake cross-border acquisitions than domestic acquisitions 
since cross-border acquisitions help to reduce their bankruptcy risk as well as generate more value for 
16 
 
their shareholders. Therefore, we expect net geographic diversification benefits for constrained firms, 
leading us to hypothesise as follows:     
Hypothesis 4: The negative effect of leverage deviation on the probability of undertaking 
acquisitions is mitigated when firms undertake foreign (cross-border) acquisitions, rather 
than when they make domestic (within-country) acquisitions.    
 
Data and methods 
Method of analysis 
In order to examine the link between leverage deviation and the probability of undertaking acquisitions, 
we follow a two-step procedure as in Uysal (2011). In the first step, we estimate the leverage deviations 
for firms in year t; and in the second step, we examine whether the leverage deviation in year t affects 
the probability of undertaking acquisitions in the future (i.e. years t to t+5) using a multivariate probit 
regression. 
In defining future acquisitions to include deals undertaken by a firm within 5 years, we recognise 
that firms often make adjustments to their leverage, and thus, our sample firms that have leverage 
deviations in year t could make alterations to their leverage and gradually eliminate the deviations within 
the 5-year timeframe. Our choice of a 5-year period is motivated by the capital structure literature 
which suggests that the average firm that deviates from its optimal leverage ratio takes about 4 to 5 years 
to return to its optimal leverage level (e.g. Lemmon et al., 2008).4  
Following prior studies such as Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Uysal (2011), we define leverage 
deviation as the difference between a firm’s actual leverage and its optimal leverage ratio. Thus, positive 
(negative) deviations denote overleveraging (underleveraging). While the actual leverage ratio can be 
                                                          
4In untabulated results, we vary our definition for future acquisitions to separately consider acquisitions 
undertaken in periods t+1 only, t+2 only, t+3 only, t+4 only, and t+5 only. All the periods (except t+5) 
showed a significantly negative association between leverage deviation in year t and acquisition activities in those 
individual years. In t+5, the relationship was positive but insignificant. Thus, it is unlikely that our results and 
conclusions are significantly influenced by our time scale used in defining future acquisitions. In the interest of 
brevity, these results are not tabulated but are available upon request.  
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readily computed from publicly available financial data, the optimal leverage ratio is unobservable and 
needs to be estimated. Based on the tradition in this field of research, we formulate Eq. (1) to estimate 
the optimal leverage ratio by running a cross-sectional regression of market leverage on the 
determinants of capital structure documented in prior studies (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Antoniou 
et al., 2008). Thus, the optimal leverage ratio of firm i is its fitted value of Eq. (1).  
    itiit
XLeverage  +++= −1,                 Eq. (1) 
In Eq. (1), Leverageit represents the market financial leverage (defined as total debt divided by the 
sum of total debt and market equity) of firm i in year t while  represents the one-period lag of firm-
specific capital structure determinants (i.e. non-debt tax shelter, asset tangibility, research and 
development (R&D) expense ratio, a dummy for missing R&D expense, return volatility, growth 
opportunity, firm size, profitability, stock return, past leverage levels). We define the variables as 
follows: (1) Non-debt tax shelter – accumulated depreciation divided by total assets; (2) Asset 
tangibility – net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets; (3) R&D expense ratio – R&D 
expense divided by total assets; (4) Missing R&D dummy – one if R&D value is missing, otherwise zero; 
and (5) Return volatility – standard deviation of the monthly stock return for the year. The above 
definitions follow those contained in studies such as Hovakimian et al. (2004), Harford et al. (2009), 
Antoniou et al. (2008), and Uysal (2011). The definitions for the remaining variables (e.g. growth 
opportunities, size, etc.) are discussed below under the control variables for the multivariate probit 
regression. Eq. (1) also includes dummies to capture industry and time fixed-effect ( ). To conserve 
space, we do not report the results of the optimal leverage regression. 
In the second step, the baseline multivariate regression has a dummy (i.e. acquirer=1 and non-
acquirer=0) as its dependent variable and leverage deviation (or a variant of it that reflects the direction 
or extent of leverage deviation) as the explanatory variable of interest. The baseline model includes 
several control variables selected based on guidance from the M&A literature and our intuition. First, 




investments/acquisitions. We use the average debt ratio for the past 3 years as a proxy for the past debt 
burden. Second, we control for firm size because large firms may find it easier to raise funds for their 
acquisitions. Following Rajan & Zingales (1995), we measure firm size as the natural log of total assets. 
Third, since the managerial inefficiency theory (Manne, 1965) suggests that better performing firms 
tend to be acquirers, we include the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA) to total assets to control for firm’s performance/profitability. We expect this variable to 
proxy for managerial performance (or inefficiencies) other than those related to capital structure issues.  
Fourth, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis implies that high free-cash flow firms are more 
likely to make acquisitions. In line with Harford et al. (2009), cash and cash equivalent divided by total 
assets is included to proxy for firms’ cash holdings. Fifth, we include the average annual stock return to 
account for two effects, i.e., the performance effect and the misvaluation effect posited by Shleifer & 
Vishny (2003). Firms with high stock return may be deemed as better performing or overvalued and 
hence are more likely to make acquisitions, especially stock exchange deals. Sixth, Jovanovic & Rousseau 
(2002) suggest that M&As tend to be between high-Q firms and low-Q firms, which implies that high 
growth firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions. Thus, we control for growth opportunities by 
including the market-to-book ratio (see Antoniou et al., 2008). The inclusion of this variable further 
minimizes the possibility that our key conclusions may be driven by potential limited investment 
opportunities associated with extreme underleveraging or overleveraging. Seventh, we include the 
Herfindhal index for product and geographic diversification to account for the effect of firms’ existing 
diversification strategies. We expect diversified (focused) firms to be more likely to undertake 
diversifying (related) acquisitions. Similarly, we expect firms with (without) foreign operations to be 
more likely to undertake cross-border (domestic) acquisitions.  
Eighth, since M&As tend to occur in waves (see Martynova & Renneboog, 2008), we capture this 
effect by including the industry M&A liquidity variable to reflect the annual volume of acquisitions in an 
industry. Like Uysal (2011), we measure the industry M&A liquidity as the total value of acquisitions in 
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a year within an industry divided by the annual total sales for the industry. Ninth, Uysal (2011) argues 
that firms in highly concentrated industries have fewer targets available for acquisition within the 
industry which could limit acquisition activities, particularly related acquisitions. So, we proxy for the 
level of industry concentration by using the sales for the constituent firms to construct industry 
Herfindhal index. Tenth, similar to Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1990), we include the target firms’ 
industry sales growth to control for the target firms’ attractiveness.5 Finally, we include year and 
industry dummies in order to account for changes in the macroeconomic conditions (e.g. interest rates 
and inflation rates) over the sample period and other industry-fixed effect beyond industry M&A 
liquidity and industry concentration. 
Our choice of probit regression model over other binary probability models such as logit and linear 
probability model is due to desirable statistical properties of probit models including producing 
consistent estimates of asymptotic standard errors (Powell, 1997) and to help us to directly compare our 
estimates to the prior US findings in Uysal (2011). Again, to aid comparison with prior studies, we 
report the average marginal effect for the main results.    
 
Data 
To empirically examine the relationship between firms’ leverage deviation and the probability of 
undertaking acquisitions, we started by collecting publicly listed UK firms that are found on Datastream 
for the period 1996 to 2006. The pre-1996 firms were excluded because most of them did not have the 
data required to construct the study’s variables. The cut-off date of 2006 was chosen due to the need to 
relate a firm’s leverage deviation in year t to its acquisitions occurring in years t to t+5. For instance, for 
firms in 2006, our empirical procedures require us to relate their leverage deviations in 2006 to their 
acquisitions occurring during 2006 and 2011. Hence, it was not practicable to include firms beyond year 
                                                          
5We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. However, information on target firms is only 
available for those firms that made acquisitions. For non-acquirers, we assume their counterfactual targets to be in 
the same industry as them, and therefore use their industry data in the target’s industry sales growth computation. 
Excluding this variable does not change our main conclusions. 
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2006 since all their required future acquisitions (5 years forward) were unobservable at the time of data 
collection.  
We only keep those firms in our sample for which there is available data to calculate leverage 
deviation and all other variables needed for the multivariate probit regression. Following the extant 
literature (e.g. Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; Uysal, 2011; Kayhan and Titman, 2007), we also exclude firms 
from the financial and regulated utilities industries. The final sample consists of 9,749 observations for 
1,845 unique firms. The distribution of the sample across industry and years are displayed in Panel A of 
Table 1. The sample is almost evenly distributed across the years but not across industries.  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Since our primary aim is to relate leverage deviations to firms’ M&A activities, we also obtained 
data on all completed M&As by our sample firms during 1996 to 2011 from Thomson Financials’ 
Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Merger and Acquisitions database. There were 9,115 completed 
M&As valued at over £800 trillion made by our sample firms. Panel B of Table 1 contains the 
characteristics of our M&A sample. The deals are almost evenly split between within-industry (52%) 
and cross-industry deals (48%). The within-industry deals are on average larger than the cross-industry 
deals (£129m vs. £43m). Consistent with Doukas & Kan (2008), we define acquisitions to be within-
industry (cross-industry) when the acquirer and the target firm share the same (different) 2-digit SIC 
code.  
When the deals are classified by their potential to impact the acquirer’s geographic diversification, 
we find the domestic deals (57%) to outnumber the cross-border deals (43%). But the average cross-
border deal is bigger than the average domestic deal (£145m vs. £45m). We define domestic (cross-
border) deals to include those acquisitions which have the acquirer and the target firm domiciled in the 





In order to implement our probit regressions to examine the impact of leverage deviation on acquisition 
probability, we utilise the M&A data to segregate our 9,749 observations into acquirers and non-
acquirers. We define acquirers to include firms in year t that are observed to have made at least one 
acquisition during the years t to t+5. In contrast, firms in year t that had no acquisitions during t to t+5 
were deemed to be non-acquirers. Based on this definition, over half (60%) of the firms in our sample 
was classified as acquirers, with the remaining 40% classified as non-acquirers.  
We also distinguish between firms that substantially deviate from their optimal leverage ratios 
(extreme deviation firms) and those that are close to the optimal leverage (moderate deviation firms). 
Following Uysal (2011), this segregation is done by utilising the estimated leverage deviation variable to 
divide our 9,749 firms into quartiles. The first and fourth quartile (Q1 and Q4) firms are termed 
extreme deviation firms, and it is this group of firms that we expect to be sub-optimal and should thus 
experience higher levels of financing/investment constraints. The extreme deviants are either extremely 
underleveraged (Q1) or extremely overleveraged (Q4). Since the second and third quartile (Q2 and 
Q3) firms are relatively closer to the optimal leverage, we classified them as moderate deviation firms, 
and they are not expected to face substantial risk of financial/investment constraints.  
Overall, our empirical test of the link between leverage deviation and acquisition probability is 
implemented by employing our subsamples of acquirers and non-acquirers, on the one hand, and the 




Table 2 (Panel A) reports descriptive statistics for the study’s variables for the full sample and also across 
the acquirer and non-acquirer subsamples. To limit the effect of outliers, we have winzorised all the 
variables, (except leverage deviation) at the bottom and top 1%. We did not winzorise leverage 
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deviation because the variables used in deriving it were first winzorised. More so, it is the extreme 
values of the leverage deviation variable that are of particular interest to this study. 
According to our full data, the standard deviation for leverage deviation is 0.113 and the highest 
underleveraged (overleveraged) firm is about 75% (73%) below (above) its optimal leverage. These 
statistics suggest a substantial variation in the leverage ratios of our sample firms around their optimal 
leverage ratios. Further, relative to the acquirers, the non-acquirers exhibit characteristics that suggest 
that they may find it difficult to access capital for their investment projects. Specifically, the non-
acquirers have significantly higher past debt burden (0.21 vs. 0.18), lower levels of growth prospects 
(1.95 vs. 2.13), profitability (0.018 vs. 0.080), stock return (0.001 vs. 009), size (10.7 vs. 11.5), and 
foreign sales (0.20 vs. 0.27). In Panel B of Table 2, the correlation coefficients are low (all below 0.41), 
indicating that multicolinearity may not pose any serious limitations on our multivariate regressions.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
Table 3 displays the results for the test of Hypothesis 1 which predicts a negative association 
between leverage deviation and acquisition probability. As shown in Model 1, the leverage deviation 
(continuous) variable is negative and statistically significant (  =-0.094, p=0.049), indicating that a 
unit deviation from a firm’s optimal leverage is associated with an average of 9.4% lower probability of 
completing an acquisition in the future (i.e. t to t+5). Though the result in Model 1 supports Hypothesis 
1, it does not adequately show how extreme leverage deviation relates to firms’ acquisition probability. 
Accordingly, in Models 2–4, we capture the collective extreme deviation (Q1 and Q4) effect as well as 
the individual extremely underleveraged (Q1) and overleveraged (Q4) effects relative to moderate 
deviation firms (Q2 and Q3). This is implemented by modifying our baseline model to include the 
following interaction variables in the relevant Models: (1) an interaction term between leverage 
deviation and a dummy for extreme deviation firms (Model 2); (2) an interaction term between leverage 
deviation and a dummy for extremely underleveraged firms (Model 3); and (3) an interaction term 
between leverage deviation and a dummy for extremely overleveraged firms (Model 4).  
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The results in Model 2 of Table 3 indicate that the interaction variable for leverage deviation and the 
dummy for extreme deviations is negative and significant ( =-0.790, p=0.005), implying a 
significantly lower chance of completing acquisitions when firms maintain leverage levels that 
substantially depart from their optimal leverage ratios. The coefficient for the extreme deviation dummy 
suggests that extreme deviant firms generally have about 2.9% significantly lower probability of making 
an acquisition. Also, the coefficient for leverage deviation which represents the average effect of the 
other (moderate deviation) firms is positive and significant. This implies that relative to the extreme 
deviant firms, the leverage deviation of moderate deviants is positively associated with acquisition 
likelihood. 
[INSERT TABLE 3]   
Further, we recognise that extreme deviations from the optimal leverage may take one of two 
forms, i.e., firms may stay under (underleverage) or go beyond the optimal level (overleverage). 
Moreover, we have argued in Section 2 that both extreme under- and over-leveraging are expected to 
reduce acquisition propensity. Therefore, we test our argument/assumption in Models 3 and 4, by 
splitting the extreme deviation effect into underleverage (Q1) and overleverage (Q4) effects. Consistent 
with our conjecture, the results show that both extreme underleveraging and extreme overleveraging 
have a negative and statistically significant effect on corporate acquisition probability (  =-0.523, 
p=0.097, in Model 3;  =-0.950, p=0.002, in Model 4).  
The results for the test of the mediating roles of internal capabilities and corporate diversification 
on the link between leverage deviation and acquisition probability (Hypotheses 2-4) are presented in 
Table 4. As argued earlier in Section 2, the resource-based view suggests that firms with superior 
internal (intangible) resources, in the form of technological, organisational, and managerial capabilities, 
may be more appealing to investors, and hence can neutralise any potential negative effect of leverage 
deviation on their ability to complete acquisitions (Hypothesis 2). Testing Hypothesis 2 requires an 
empirical proxy for firm capabilities. A careful assessment of the bundle of internal firm capabilities in 
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Barney (1991) and Teece et al. (1997) suggests that market-based performance measures such as Tobin’s 
q or stock returns which capture investors’ assessments of firms’ intangible attributes provide the best 
empirical estimates for firms’ internal capabilities.6 Thus, we use Tobin’s q (measure of growth 
prospects) as our main measure of the envelopment of the myriad of organisational capabilities residing 
inside the firm.     
The results reported in Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 provide support for Hypothesis 2. Specifically, 
the effect of leverage deviation on acquisition probability becomes positive but statistically insignificant 
for high growth firms ( =0.033, p=0.764 in Model 1), while it remains negative and statistically 
significant for low growth firms (  =-0.185, p=0.001 in Model 2). In untabulated results, we also 
utilise two alternative proxies (average stock return and research and development expenditure) for 
robustness testing and the results remain qualitatively similar. Also, employing an alternative model 
involving an interaction variable between leverage deviation and the measures of internal capabilities, as 
well as, specifications that exclude growth opportunities from the list of regressors yielded similar 
conclusions. We therefore conclude that the presence of valuable firm-specific internal capabilities (as 
captured by growth prospects) moderates the negative impact of leverage deviation on acquisition 
probability.   
On the moderating impact of diversification, we have previously argued that the negative link 
between leverage deviation and acquisition probability increases or decreases according to the 
type/nature of acquisitions undertaken by a firm. In particular, Hypotheses 3 and 4 posit that the 
benefits of corporate diversification may reduce the ex-ante financial/investment constraints associated 
with leverage deviation. Thus, there should be a lesser (or greater) effect of leverage deviation on 
acquisition probability when firms undertake diversifying (cross-industry and cross-border) acquisitions 
                                                          
6Barney (1991) defines firms’ internal resources/capabilities to include all resources and strengths (such as assets, 
capabilities, organisational processes, management skills and innovation, firm attributes, information, and 
knowledge, etc.) that the firm can use to conceive of and implement its strategies. Teece et al (1997) also note 
that firms’ resources that are capable of generating competitive advantage and value-creating strategies consist of a 
portfolio of difficult-to-trade knowledge assets which include technological, organisational, and managerial 
processes residing in the firm.  
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rather than non-diversifying (within-industry and domestic) acquisitions. In conducting these tests, the 
baseline multivariate probit regression is slightly modified. The dependent variable reflects the specific 
type of acquisition (i.e. cross-industry, within-industry, cross-border, or domestic) being modelled. For 
example, in modelling the probability of undertaking a cross-industry acquisition, the dependent 
variable is one if a firm makes a cross-industry acquisition, and zero otherwise. The independent variable 
of interest in this set of analysis is the continuous variable (not a dummy) for leverage deviation.  
The results reported in Models 3 and 4 of Table 4 show that while leverage deviation has a positive 
but statistically insignificant impact on cross-industry acquisitions ( =0.009, p=0.856, in Model 3), its 
impact on within-industry acquisitions is significantly negative ( =-0.140, p=0.005, in Model 4). The 
conclusion remains unchanged when we repeat the tests for the subsample of extreme deviation firms 
and for our extremely underleveraged and overleveraged subsamples. In the interest of brevity, these 
latter results are untabulated. Overall, the results reported in Models 3–4 provide strong evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 3, and suggest that firms that deviate from their optimal leverage have a better 
chance of completing a cross-industry acquisition compared to a within-industry acquisition.  
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
Turning to the role of geographic diversification, the results displayed in Models 5–6 of Table 4 
suggest that the negative impact of leverage deviation on acquisition probability is statistically 
insignificant when firms commit to undertake cross-border (foreign) acquisitions but remains significant 
in domestic (within-country) acquisitions. While the negative link between leverage deviation and 
acquisition probability is only -0.009 with p-value of 0.864 in cross-border acquisitions (Model 5), the 
value is higher, -0.117 (p=0.017), in domestic acquisitions (Model 6). These results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 4 and suggest that firms that deviate from their optimal leverage ratios have better 




Finally, the results on the control variables help to eliminate other potential explanations for our 
key findings. A possible concern about our finding of lower acquisition probability among extreme 
deviation (extremely under- and over-leveraged) firms is that they may not have the incentive to make 
acquisitions possibly because they have made recent investments or do not have sufficient investment 
opportunities. Since most huge corporate investments rely on debt (Harford et al., 2009), these 
concerns are minimized by specifically controlling for firms’ past debt burden. As the results indicate, 
firms with high past debt burden (likely to represent those with recent capital investments) are less 
likely to make acquisitions in the immediate future. More so, past investments are likely to reduce 
future growth opportunities. Therefore, we control for the growth opportunities of the firms. As 
expected, we find firms with higher growth opportunities (lesser past investments) to be more likely to 
make acquisitions. Further, acquisitions are more likely among larger firms and those with higher 
international business experience, profitability, and stock return, as well as those targeting firms in 
growth industries. However, the finding of lower acquisition propensity for high cash-flow firms is 
inconsistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (agency theory). Finally, the level of product 
diversification within a firm and the level of concentration within an industry as well as the frequency of 
acquisitions in an industry do not seem to significantly influence acquisition propensity. Most of the time 
and industry dummies were statistically significant but are unreported to conserve space. 
 
Robustness checks 
This section conducts a number of robustness tests. First, we test whether the history of acquisitions 
and/or past acquisition experience affects our results. We conduct this analysis by repeating the pooled 
cross-sectional probit regression (CSA) for only our subsample of acquirers that made more than one 
acquisitions during t and t+5 (i.e. multiple acquirers). As shown in Model 1 of Table 5, the significant 
negative association between leverage deviation and acquisition probability remains ( =-0.128, 
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p=0.032). Thus, our conclusions are not affected by the history of acquisitions and/or past acquisition 
experience of the acquiring firms.  
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
Second, we assess the possible impact of endogeneity on our results by implementing generalised 
least squares (GLS) random-effect (panel) regressions to eliminate unobserved firm heterogeneity (e.g. 
managerial ability). The panel data models do not easily allow us to relate the leverage deviation in t to 
all the acquisitions occurring in t to t+5, so we match a firm’s leverage deviation against its acquisitions 
in that year. Consequently, the M&A data for the panel data model only covers the period 1996-2006 
(but not 1996-2011). Further, the panel data models implemented in STATA 14 does not allow us to 
report the marginal effects for the coefficients, so the original parameter estimates are reported in 
Model 2 of Table 5. The coefficients cannot therefore be directly interpreted as probabilities. The panel 
data results in Model 2 ( =-0.457, p=0.007) remain qualitatively similar to our earlier cross-sectional 
probit results.  
In addition, we conduct analysis of the key issues by digging deeper into our subsample of 
acquirers. We regress the number of acquisitions made by a firm on its leverage deviation and the set of 
control variables. From Model 3 of Table 5, we observe a significantly negative relationship between the 
number of acquisitions made and leverage deviation (  =-0.208, p=0.006), indicating that deviations 
from the optimal leverage ratio does not only limit the propensity to undertake acquisitions, but also 
constrains the number of acquisitions that firms are able to make in a period. Since these results are not 
based on our baseline probit models, we report the results for the internal capabilities, industrial and 
geographic diversification hypotheses. As can be seen in Models 4–5, leverage deviation significantly 
constrains the number of acquisitions in both high-growth firms (  =-0.476, p=0.005, in Model 4) and 
low-growth firms ( =-0.235, p=0.007, in Model 5). This suggests that firm’ internal capabilities do 
not moderate the effect of leverage deviation on the number of acquisitions made.  
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However, in Models 6–9, leverage deviation has no significant effect on the number of cross-
industry (  =0.014, p=0.928, in Model 6) and cross-border ( =-0.028, p=0.865, in Model 8) 
acquisitions made. However, the effect of leverage deviation on the number of acquisitions made is 
negative and significant in both within-industry ( =-0.339, p=0.004, in Model 7) and domestic (  =-
0.269, p=0.008, in Model 9) acquisitions. It seems the industrial and geographic diversification benefits 
extend to the number of acquisitions made by acquirers. In sum, these poisson regression results, based 
on the number of acquisitions (a count dependent variable), are qualitatively similar to those derived 
from the probit models (based on a binary dependent variable), except for our internal capabilities 
hypothesis (H2).  
Finally, in untabulated results, we find very mild evidence to suggest that the benefits of 
diversification in mitigating the negative effect of leverage deviation on acquisition likelihood may be 
non-monotonic. Specifically, the effect of leverage deviation on acquisition propensity is insignificantly 
positive (but often negative) when firms make single (multiple) diversifying acquisitions. This suggests 
that beyond a single diversifying acquisition, the benefits associated with diversifying acquisitions 
weaken. Overall, our main finding of leverage deviation restricting acquisition activities (incidence and 
frequency), especially non-diversifying acquisitions (within-industry and domestic deals) is robust across 
a raft of economic specifications and subsamples.              
 
Discussion 
Taken together, the empirical findings presented in this article provide strong evidence that 
corporate deviations from the optimal leverage ratio are associated with lower acquisition probability. 
This is consistent with the findings in the US study by Uysal (2011). Given the similarity of the 
financial/economic systems between the UK and US, the findings imply that investors in a market 
economy do punish corporate inefficiencies by withholding financing from suboptimal firms. However, 
our finding compared with that of Uysal (2011) indicates that the average leverage deviation effect on 
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acquisition probability is stronger in the UK (-0.094) than in the US (-0.052). This suggests that a UK 
firm that deviates from its optimal leverage is about 1.8 times less likely to make an acquisition 
compared to its US counterpart. 
The higher leverage deviation effect for our UK sample may simply reflect the institutional 
difference between the UK and the US in terms of access to credit and financial market development. 
The UK, compared with the US, has a relatively smaller and illiquid financial market. In particular, the 
more developed bonds markets in the US seems to give US firms greater access to public bond (see 
Mittoo & Zhang, 2010), and in turn results in lower borrowing costs and reduced financing constraints 
for US deviant firms. Altogether, deviations from leverage deviation is costly for both US and UK firms, 
but the relatively smaller and less liquid financial market in the UK make financially-constrained UK 
firms appear to face a more serious financing problem than their US counterparts with access to a wider 
domestic financial market. This suggests that the size and efficiency of the national financial markets may 
influence the levels of financing constraints (at the firm-level) associated with leverage deviations. The 
difference in the leverage deviation effect may also be due to the difference in the research design of the 
two studies. As noted earlier, the prior study relates a firm’s leverage deviation to its acquisitions during 
an 18-year period, whereas the present study relates a firm’s leverage deviation in year t to its 
acquisitions within a shorter time frame (t to t+5). Thus, our sample firms don’t seem to have sufficient 
time to undo their leverage deviations prior to undertaking acquisitions, which then makes the 
constraints associated with their leverage deviation more binding on them.  
The study’s finding of a significant (though weak) and negative association between extreme 
underleveraging and acquisition probability is inconsistent with the view that extreme underleveraging 
may represent unused debt capacity (DeAngelo et al., 2011). Our findings imply that any form of 
extreme deviation (whether underleverage or overleverage) may be associated with a reduced ability to 
undertake acquisitions. Our results also confirm the findings in van Binsbergen et al. (2010) that the 
costs associated with overleveraging is far greater than that of underleveraging. Extreme overleveraging 
30 
 
seems to almost certainly make it impossible for firms to undertake acquisitions in the immediate future 
(effect of -95.0%), whereas extreme underleveraging halves the chances of undertaking an acquisition 
(effect of -52.3%). Overall, the results imply that the optimal leverage ratio is important because 
deviating substantially from it restricts firms’ ability to undertake future investments. 
The paper also finds evidence to suggest that the cost of leverage deviation in terms of limiting the 
ability to complete acquisitions is not symmetric across all firms. In fact, firms that have valuable 
organisation resources such as superior managerial and technological capabilities seem to be able to 
neutralise the cost of leverage deviation. This supports the resource-based view of the firm, which 
suggests that some firm-specific capabilities could act as a source of competitive advantage and value-
creation for firms (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997). These findings also imply that investors in 
financing M&As do indeed consider the value-creation potential of those deals through the 
resources/capabilities residing inside the acquiring firm.   
Another key empirical evidence presented in this paper is that corporate diversification, both 
industrial and geographic, moderates the financial/investment constraints that may be associated with 
deviations from optimal leverage ratios. This supports the view that corporate diversification may have 
more financial benefits than costs (Lewellen, 1971; Hann et al., 2013), especially for financially 
constrained firms (Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016). First, we show that the financing/investment 
constraints associated with leverage deviation disappear when managers choose cross-industry deals, but 
not within-industry deals. Given that cross-industry deals are more likely to lead to increased levels of 
product diversification, our results support the recent findings in Yan et al. (2010) and Kuppuswamy & 
Villalonga (2016), suggesting that industrial diversification results in net benefits for financially 
constrained firms. The specific reasons which possibly make cross-industry acquisitions advantageous 
include their potential to diversify acquirers’ cash flows, and the development of new internal capital 
markets or improvements in the efficiency of existing internal capital markets, among others. Similarly, 
our results support the view that increasing levels of geographic diversification through M&As may be 
31 
 
associated with net benefits (Ahmed & Elshandidy, 2018), partly emanating from improved stability of 
cash flow, higher market share, and competitive advantages from obtaining strategic assets, advanced 
technologies, and new skills by expanding into new geographic locations (see Nocke & Yeaple, 2007).   
 
Conclusions and managerial implications 
This study contributes to the literature on the link between capital structure and investment decisions by 
documenting a negative association between a firm’s deviations from its optimal leverage ratio and its 
ability to initiate and successfully complete acquisitions. This suggests that deviation from the optimal 
leverage makes it difficult to raise further debt capital to finance subsequent corporate investments, 
possibly because the firms with leverage deviation are viewed by investors to be either too risky or sub-
optimal. We also find the association between leverage deviation and the probability of undertaking an 
acquisition among our UK sample to be almost twice larger than that reported in the prior US study by 
Uysal (2011). This suggests that the cost for firms with leverage deviation (in terms of the difficulty in 
obtaining financing and the subsequent forgone acquisition deals) is much higher for UK firms than was 
previously suggested in the US literature. Perhaps, the relatively smaller bonds market (in comparison 
with that of the US bond markets) in the UK worsens the higher cost of capital problem faced by UK 
firms with leverage deviations. Another implication of the results is that it is not sufficient for firms to 
have optimal leverage ratios, but corporate managers must strive to keep their leverage levels closer to 
the optimal leverage. Thus, the results provide evidence in support of the existence and relevance of the 
trade-off theory of capital structure. Moreover, if deviations from the optimal leverage are reflective of 
inefficient (sub-optimal) managerial actions, then the results are consistent with the managerial 
inefficiency theory of M&A. That is, managers of firms with sub-optimal leverage policies are unlikely to 
become acquirers in acquisition deals.     
More importantly, we show that firms that have deviated from their optimal leverage ratios face 
different financing/investment constraints depending on their existing levels of firm-specific internal 
32 
 
capabilities and the type of acquisitions they propose to undertake. The firms with higher internal 
capabilities do not seem to face significant constraints in terms of the incidence (but not the volume) of 
acquisitions even when they deviate from the optimal leverage. Similarly, those firms with leverage 
deviations that pursue cross-industry acquisitions seem to face lower constraints relative to those that 
undertake within-industry acquisitions. These results imply that the anticipated benefits such as sustained 
competitive advantages associated with internal organisational capabilities, as well as, the improved cash 
flow stability associated with corporate industrial diversification tend to moderate the 
financing/investment constraints associated with leverage deviation. Furthermore, we provide evidence 
to suggest that geographic diversification may also reduce the financial/investment constraints associated 
with leverage deviation. We show that firms with leverage deviation generally face no 
financing/investment constraints when they propose cross-border (foreign) deals, but do face significant 
constraints when they propose domestic (within-country) deals. This finding is consistent with the view 
that international business/diversification has financial benefits through achieving greater market share 
and new skills and resources from new foreign locations.  
Taken together, the empirical evidence in this paper suggests that there are some benefits of firms’ 
internal capabilities and corporate diversification that are anticipated by suppliers of capital when a 
deviant firm (possibly with some internal non-financial capabilities) commits to undertake an investment 
which has the potential to diversify its cash flows across other industries or countries. Therefore, 
managers of firms with leverage deviation may be more successful in overcoming the 
financing/investment constraints faced by their firms when they embark on diversifying (cross-industry 
and cross-border) investments than non-diversifying (within-industry and domestic) investments. 
Additionally, the financing/investment constraints may be mitigated if deviant firms are able to enhance 
their internal (intangible) resources/capabilities.   
Although this paper contributes to the literature by suggesting that the diversification characteristics 
of a proposed acquisition deal may influence the financing/investment constraints associated with 
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leverage deviation, it does not consider how the pre-acquisition level of diversification of the acquiring 
firm itself could influence the financing/investment constraints related to leverage deviation. Future 
studies can further inquire into this matter. It may also be interesting to investigate the link between 
leverage deviation and investments in emerging economies with less developed capital markets. Further, 
our results are based on a sample of UK firms and thus its generalizability to other contexts may be 
limited. A study involving an international sample and enabling a cross-country analysis will be a step in 
the right direction. Finally, our results should be interpreted with caution because inasmuch we 
controlled for several factors in our empirical model, data limitations did not permit us to include proxy 
variables for corporate governance, for example, which may influence a firm’s propensity to acquire.   
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Panel A reports the distribution of the sample across industry and years. Panel B reports the distribution of the M&A sample. Cross-industry (within-industry) deals have the acquirer and target firm in different (same) industry 
as defined by the 2-digit SIC codes. Cross-border (domestic) deals have the acquirer and the target firm domiciled in different (same) countries. 
 
 
Table 1 - PANEL A: Sample firms by year and industry 
Industry/Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Automobiles & Parts 9 8 9 8 6 7 6 6 8 8 5 80 
Basic Resources 21 22 20 18 18 17 19 20 21 27 29 232 
Chemicals 31 28 24 22 17 17 16 16 16 14 14 215 
Construction & Materials 53 56 51 43 41 37 36 35 32 30 28 442 
Food & Beverage 53 48 47 45 39 35 35 33 32 29 29 425 
Health Care 29 35 38 49 48 52 58 59 56 60 74 558 
Industrial Goods & Services 282 272 251 253 238 247 245 260 249 243 258 2798 
Media 61 60 51 50 48 62 78 75 76 71 72 704 
Oil & Gas 19 19 18 23 23 26 27 34 33 33 41 296 
Personal & Household Goods 117 112 101 88 84 81 77 73 64 61 59 917 
Retail 87 85 84 88 85 80 71 69 67 65 62 843 
Technology 64 64 65 86 97 143 165 156 141 148 158 1287 
Telecommunications 4 7 10 10 9 16 13 12 12 15 17 125 
Travel & Leisure 59 64 72 78 77 86 89 82 81 70 69 827 
Total 889 880 841 861 830 906 935 930 888 874 915 9749 
PANEL B: M&A distribution by types of acquisitions 
Type of deal All deals Cross-industry deals Within-industry deals Cross-border deals Domestic deals 






















Table 2 - PANEL A: Summary statistics for full sample and sub-samples 
Variables/Sample firms 
All firms (Obs.=9,749) Acquirers (Obs.=5,858) Non-acquirers (Obs.=3,891) 
Mean Std. dev.  Min. Max. Mean Std. dev.  Min. Max. Mean Std. dev.  Min. Max. 
Independent variables   
  
             
Leverage deviation 0.000 0.113 -0.745 0.727 -0.004 0.106 -0.745 0.659 0.006 0.123 -0.680 0.727 
Moderate deviation -0.007 0.020 -0.055 0.044 -0.007 0.020 -0.055 0.044 -0.006 0.019 -0.055 0.043 
Extreme deviation 0.006 0.111 -0.745 0.727 0.002 0.104 -0.745 0.659 0.012 0.121 -0.680 0.727 
Extreme underleverage -0.029 0.065 -0.745 0.000 -0.028 0.063 -0.745 0.000 -0.031 0.068 -0.680 0.000 
Extreme overleverage 0.035 0.077 0.000 0.727 0.030 0.071 0.000 0.659 0.043 0.086 0.000 0.727 
Control variables   
  
    
  
  
   
  
Average past leverage 0.195 0.184 0.000 0.810 0.182 0.164 0.000 0.810 0.214 0.210 0.000 0.810 
Growth opportunities 2.060 2.036 0.574 16.705 2.131 1.980 0.574 16.705 1.953 2.112 0.574 16.705 
Firm size 11.161 2.012 6.144 16.401 11.498 2.056 6.144 16.401 10.655 1.832 6.144 16.401 
Profitability 0.055 0.279 -1.914 0.426 0.080 0.259 -1.914 0.426 0.018 0.302 -1.914 0.426 
Stock return 0.006 0.048 -0.135 0.189 0.009 0.046 -0.135 0.189 0.001 0.051 -0.135 0.189 
Cash ratio 0.145 0.182 0.000 0.940 0.143 0.171 0.000 0.940 0.147 0.197 0.000 0.940 
Firm diversification index 0.233 0.266 0.000 0.863 0.253 0.271 0.000 0.863 0.204 0.255 0.000 0.855 
Firm foreign experience 0.245 0.261 0.000 0.843 0.273 0.264 0.000 0.843 0.201 0.250 0.000 0.831 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.072 0.119 0.000 0.946 0.077 0.128 0.000 0.946 0.065 0.103 0.000 0.946 
Industry concentration 0.110 0.112 0.019 0.811 0.110 0.112 0.019 0.811 0.111 0.112 0.019 0.810 
Target industry sales growth 0.039 0.126 -0.417 0.631 0.042 0.134 -0.417 0.631 0.035 0.114 -0.417 0.631 
PANEL B: Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Leverage deviation (1) 1.000 
          
  
Average past leverage (2) 0.314
a 1.000 




Growth opportunities (3) -0.013a -0.311a 1.000 
        
  
Firm size (4) 0.002 0.200a -0.225a 1.000 
       
  
Profitability (5) 0.015 -0.014 -0.209a 0.345a 1.000 
      
  
Stock return (6) -0.022b -0.166a 0.157a 0.024b 0.171a 1.000 
     
  
Cash ratio (7) -0.074a -0.404a 0.332a -0.246a -0.243a 0.020c 1.000 
    
  
Firm diversification index (8) 0.001 0.113a -0.105a 0.359a 0.111a -0.012 -0.155a 1.000 
   
  
Firm foreign experience (9) 0.004 0.038a -0.026a 0.389a 0.098a -0.005 -0.025a 0.248a 1.000 
  
  
Industry M&A liquidity (10) -0.005 -0.065a 0.174a -0.054a -0.023b 0.089a 0.090a -0.009 -0.008 1.000 
 
  
Industry concentration (11) 0.001 -0.090a 0.146a 0.024b -0.105a 0.009 0.168a -0.046a 0.023b 0.175a 1.000   
Target industry sales growth (12) -0.024b -0.014 0.094a -0.012 0.024b 0.069a 0.015 -0.037a -0.046a 0.145a 0.079a 1.000 
Table 2 (Panel A) reports the mean statistics for the variables of the study. Figures in bold indicate those values with no statistically significant difference between acquirer and non-acquirer statistics. Panel B is based on the 
















Table 3: Probit regressions on the relationship between acquisition probability and leverage deviation 
Models/Independent variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All firms Extreme deviant Underleveraged Overleveraged 
Leverage deviation  -0.094** (0.048) 0.682** (0.280) 0.433 (0.278) 0.875*** (0.284) 
Leverage deviation*Extreme deviant dummy  -0.790*** (0.282)   
Extreme deviant dummy  -0.029** (0.011)   
Leverage deviation*Underleveraged firm dummy   -0.523* (0.315)  
Underleveraged firm dummy   -0.028 (0.020)  
Leverage deviation*Overleveraged firm dummy    -0.950*** (0.302) 
Overleveraged firm dummy    -0.016 (0.021) 
Average past leverage -0.242*** (0.034) -0.240*** (0.035) -0.072 (0.048) -0.352*** (0.043) 
Growth opportunities  0.013*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.003) 
Firm size 0.059*** (0.003) 0.059*** (0.003) 0.057*** (0.004) 0.059*** (0.004) 
Profitability 0.047** (0.022) 0.049** (0.022) 0.041* (0.045) 0.062** (0.026) 
Stock return 0.451*** (0.121) 0.409*** (0.122) 0.429*** (0.142) 0.253* (0.146) 
Cash ratio -0.078** (0.034) -0.076** (0.034) -0.047 (0.037) -0.087** (0.039) 
Firm diversification index -0.021 (0.021) -0.021 (0.021) -0.018 (0.025) -0.006 (0.025) 
Firm foreign experience 0.071*** (0.023) 0.071*** (0.023) 0.092*** (0.026) 0.051* (0.026) 
Industry M&A liquidity 0.012 (0.060) 0.012 (0.060) -0.026 (0.065) 0.006 (0.069) 
Industry concentration -0.202 (0.185) -0.199 (0.184) -0.144 (0.206) -0.337 (0.219) 
Target industry sales growth 0.116*** (0.043) 0.115*** (0.043) 0.144*** (0.049) 0.132*** (0.050) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Number of observations 9,749 9,749 7,313 7,312 
Wald Chi-squared test 879.02 887.80 617.09 712.46 
Prob. > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.077 0.072 0.082 
Dependent variable=1 if a firm in year t undertakes an acquisition in the years t to t+5, and zero otherwise. Extreme deviation firms are substantially away from (either above or below) their optimal leverage. Underleveraged (overleveraged) firms have 




Table 4: Probit regressions on the leverage deviation and acquisition probability nexus: The moderating effects 
Model/Independent variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













Leverage deviation 0.033 (0.111) -0.185*** (0.055) 0.009 (0.049) -0.140*** (0.050) -0.009 (0.051) -0.117** (0.049) 
Average past leverage -0.284*** (0.100) -0.128*** (0.040) -0.180*** (0.034) -0.233*** (0.035) -0.288*** (0.036) -0.174*** (0.035) 
Growth opportunities 0.004 (0.004) 0.147*** (0.019) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
Firm size 0.042*** (0.006) 0.062*** (0.004) 0.043*** (0.003) 0.062*** (0.003) 0.068*** (0.003) 0.036*** (0.003) 
Profitability 0.064** (0.028) 0.000 (0.034) 0.015 (0.023) 0.057** (0.024) 0.016 (0.024) 0.055** (0.023) 
Stock return 0.349* (0.185) 0.464*** (0.160) 0.225* (0.120) 0.529*** (0.123)  0.482*** (0.119) 0.375*** (0.122) 
Cash ratio -0.138*** (0.047) -0.020 (0.048) -0.047 (0.033) -0.061* (0.034) 0.093*** (0.032) -0.101*** (0.034) 
Firm diversification index 0.034 (0.041) 0.010 (0.025) 0.194*** (0.020) -0.140*** (0.021) -0.015 (0.020) 0.006 (0.022) 
Firm foreign experience 0.076* (0.043) 0.049* (0.027) 0.059*** (0.022) 0.046** (0.023) 0.477*** (0.021) -0.274*** (0.023) 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.052 (0.081) 0.084 (0.090) 0.077 (0.053) -0.017 (0.059) 0.048 (0.054) 0.069 (0.058) 
Industry concentration -0.235 (0.331) -0.142 (0.235) -0.159 (0.180) -0.148 (0.186) -0.350** (0.172) 0.125 (0.190) 
Target industry sales growth 0.044 (0.077) 0.109* (0.053) 0.016 (0.042) 0.084* (0.045) 0.028 (0.042) 0.093** (0.044) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Number of observations 2,734 7,013 9,744 9,749 9,749 9,744 
Wald Chi-squared test 264.88 694.19 1316.40 799.65 1954.47 615.75 
Prob. > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.082 0.122 0.067 0.217 0.049 
This table presents results from a probit analysis of the moderating impact of firm capabilities and deal diversification on the leverage deviations-acquisition probability nexus. Models 1 and 2 are based on the baseline model and 
the subsamples are partitioned based on the average pre-acquisition growth prospects of the firms. The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm in year t undertakes a cross-industry acquisition (in Model 3), a within-
industry acquisition (Models 4), a cross-border acquisition (Models 5), a domestic acquisition (Models 6) in the years t to t+5, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported in italics and 





Table 5: Further analyses 
Model/Independent 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 



















Leverage deviation -0.128** (0.060) -0.457*** (0.199) -0.208*** (0.076) -0.476*** (0.170) -0.235*** (0.087) 0.014 (0.150) -0.339*** (0.118) 0.028 (0.166) -0.269*** (0.101) 
Average past leverage -0.305*** (0.042) -1.894*** (0.220) -0.273*** (0.057) -0.153 (0.174) -0.136** (0.067) -0.322*** (0.109) -0.274*** (0.095) -0.815*** (0.127) -0.036 (0.075) 
Growth opportunities 0.020*** (0.003) 0.052** (0.017) 0.016*** (0.004) 0.014*** (0.005) 0.169*** (0.028) 0.016** (0.008) 0.012* (0.006) 0.035*** (0.008) -0.005 (0.007) 
Firm size 0.083*** (0.004) 0.135*** (0.038) 0.103*** (0.005) 0.097*** (0.008) 0.108*** (0.006) 0.098*** (0.009) 0.103*** (0.007) 0.204*** (0.009) 0.027*** (0.007) 
Profitability 0.081*** (0.030) 0.270* (0.115) 0.084** (0.036) 0.055 (0.049) 0.068 (0.053) 0.069 (0.070) 0.147*** (0.057) 0.012 (0.077) 0.119** (0.051) 
Stock return 0.608*** (0.147) 1.987*** (0.532) 0.757*** (0.181) 0.737*** (0.268) 0.658*** (0.246) 0.448 (0.356) 1.083*** (0.286) 1.215*** (0.381) 0.501* (0.256) 
Cash ratio -0.086** (0.040) 0.546** (0.225) -0.051 (0.050) -0.173*** (0.069) 0.098 (0.070) 0.048 (0.105) -0.150** (0.075) 0.376*** (0.100) -0.252*** (0.080) 
Firm diversification index 0.005 (0.023) -0.110 (0.159) 0.115*** (0.029) 0.096**(0.052) 0.123*** (0.035) 0.672*** (0.055) -0.362*** (0.051) -0.097* (0.056) 0.256*** (0.045) 
Firm foreign experience 0.058** (0.027) 0.146 (0.196) -0.021 (0.032) -0.007 (0.056) -0.056 (0.039) 0.098 (0.060) -0.050 (0.052) 1.552*** (0.063) -1.260*** (0.056) 
Industry M&A liquidity -0.012 (0.072) 0.251 (0.261) 0.009 (0.083) -0.023 (0.107) 0.017 (0.127) 0.046 (0.138) -0.097 (0.121) -0.002 (0.155) 0.040 (0.120) 
Industry concentration -0.286 (0.212) 0.204 (0.992) -0.264 (0.252) 0.516 (0.473) -0.777*** (0.325) -1.016* (0.580) 0.116 (0.378) -0.312 (0.372) -0.182 (0.454) 
Target industry sales growth 0.176*** (0.053) 0.389* (0.199) 0.019 (0.055) 0.142 (0.095) -0.081 (0.069) -0.229** (0.099) 0.218** (0.089) 0.056 (0.099) 0.022 (0.086) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.282 (0.717) -0.095 (0.106) -0.308 (0.201) -0.185 (0.136) -1.338*** (0.244) -0.519*** (0.157) -2.325*** (0.162) -0.148 (0.199) 
                    
Number of observations 7,640 9,749 5,858 1,791 4,067 5,858 5,858 5,858 5,858 
Wald Chi-squared 1095.60 248.25 4146.45 5273.04 9462.21 2618.84 894.42 3414.6 2091.27 
Prob. > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.128  0.042 0.055 0.042 0.121 0.036 0.194 0.070 
This table presents results from a further analysis of the impact of leverage deviations of acquisition activities (probability of acquisitions in Models 1-2; and the number of acquisitions in Models 3-9). In Models 1-2, the dependent 
variable takes a value of one if a firm in year t undertakes an acquisition within years t and t+5. The dependent variable in Models 3-9 is the number of acquisitions made by an acquiring firm within t and t+5. Apart from the coefficients in 
Model 1 which are marginal effects, all the other coefficients in Models 2-7 are standard parameter estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported in italics and parentheses. All models include year and industry 
dummies. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
